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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Society views the conviction of an innocent person as 
perhaps the most grievous mistake our judicial system can 
commit.  Reflecting the gravity of such an affront to liberty, 
the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception has evolved 
to allow habeas corpus petitioners to litigate their 
constitutional claims despite certain procedural bars if the 
petitioner can make a credible showing of actual innocence.  In 
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2013, the Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013), extended this doctrine to allow 
petitioners who can make this showing to overcome the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) 
one-year statute of limitations.1  In doing so, the Supreme 
Court recognized that an untimely petition should not prevent 
a petitioner who can adequately demonstrate his actual 
innocence from pursuing his claims.  This view reflects 
society’s value judgment that procedure should yield to 
substance when actual innocence is at stake. 
Despite repeatedly asserting his innocence, Appellant 
Paul Satterfield was convicted of first degree murder in 1985 
and sentenced to life in prison.  After many years of direct and 
collateral litigation, he appeared to emerge victorious when the 
District Court, acting on his habeas petition, found that his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritorious.  But 
Satterfield’s hopes for relief were short-lived, as we reversed 
the order granting habeas relief after finding that his petition 
was barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.  Satterfield’s 
fight was revived several years later when the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in McQuiggin.  Had this decision 
been earlier, Satterfield had more solid support to pursue his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in spite of his untimely 
petition.  In McQuiggin’s wake, Satterfield sought relief from 
the judgment denying his habeas petition, characterizing 
                                              
1 AEDPA, 110 Stat. 1214, states that “[a] 1-year period 
of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).   
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McQuiggin’s change in relevant decisional law as an 
extraordinary circumstance to justify relief under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).   
The District Court denied Satterfield’s Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion after determining that McQuiggin was not an 
extraordinary circumstance.  While we do not opine whether 
the Rule 60(b)(6) motion should ultimately be granted, we will 
nonetheless vacate the District Court’s order.   In Cox v. Horn, 
757 F.3d 113 (3d. Cir. 2014), we held that changes in 
decisional law may—when paired with certain 
circumstances—justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  A district court 
addressing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a change in 
decisional law must examine the full panoply of equitable 
circumstances in the particular case before rendering a 
decision.  In this case, we believe that the District Court did not 
articulate the requisite equitable analysis, and we will remand 
for proper consideration.   
Separately, and perhaps more importantly, we explain 
that the nature of the change in decisional law must be weighed 
appropriately in the analysis of pertinent equitable factors.  
McQuiggin implicates the foundational principle of avoiding 
the conviction of an innocent man and attempts to prevent such 
a mistake through the fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception.  If Satterfield can make the required credible 
showing of actual innocence to avail himself of the 
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception had McQuiggin 
been decided when his petition was dismissed, equitable 
analysis would weigh heavily in favor of deeming 
McQuiggin’s change in law, as applied to Satterfield’s case, an 
exceptional circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  
While Satterfield’s ability to show actual innocence is not case 
determinative in that the District Court must weigh all of the 
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equitable factors as guided by precedent, we clarify that the 
nature of the change in law cannot be divorced from that 
analysis. 
I. 
 The tortuous path to Satterfield’s current appeal begins 
more than three decades ago.  In 1983, Satterfield visited the 
home of Azzizah Abdullah to repair her television set.  When 
Satterfield had finished and the television appeared to be 
working properly, Abdullah paid Satterfield’s fee.  But the 
television ceased working only a short while later, prompting 
Abdullah to summon Satterfield back to her home to complete 
the task.  He made several additional attempts to fix the 
recalcitrant television, but his efforts were in vain.  During 
Satterfield’s final service call to Abdullah’s home, her husband 
William Bryant became frustrated with Satterfield’s repeated 
failures.  Conflict erupted.  When Bryant demanded 
Abdullah’s money back while brandishing a knife and a 
baseball bat,2 Satterfield returned the money and quickly 
departed, never reporting the incident to the police. 
 Approximately one week after the altercation in 
Abdullah’s home, Bryant was shot outside his home in the 
early morning hours.  Police interviewed two eyewitnesses—
                                              
2 There are three versions of this event: (1) Satterfield 
testified that Bryant poked him with the baseball bat, (J.A. 
544); (2) Wayne Edwards claimed that Satterfield told him 
Bryant had struck him with the bat, (J.A. 488); and (3) 
Abdullah explained that Bryant had nudged Satterfield’s 
shoulder with the bat, (J.A. 465). 
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brothers Eric and Grady Freeman—on the morning of Bryant’s 
murder.  The Freemans had been in their home at the time of 
the shooting and, upon hearing the gunshots, peered out from 
their windows at the crime scene.  Eric Freeman reportedly saw 
a man who “looked like he was white,” “had like blond hair,” 
and was about 5’ 9”.3  (J.A. 695–97.)  According to Eric, the 
man briskly walked to a parked car, looked both ways before 
getting in, and had his hand inside his jacket “like he was 
putting away something.”  (J.A. 695–97.)  Grady Freeman 
similarly described seeing a “light skin guy” about 5’7” or 8”.  
(J.A. 698.)  Critically, Satterfield is a black man with brown 
hair and stands six feet tall.  (J.A. 439.) 
 Investigators soon learned of Satterfield’s recent 
altercation with Bryant.  This information yielded a search 
warrant for Satterfield’s home and car.  Upon execution, 
however, the searches produced no evidence implicating 
Satterfield, and the investigation went dormant for about a 
year.   
The story picks back up in 1984, when Satterfield met 
Patricia Edwards at a nearby racquet club.  Mrs. Edwards 
suggested that Satterfield play tennis with her husband, Wayne 
Edwards.  After playing together on several occasions, 
Satterfield and Mr. Edwards met for lunch at the racquet club.  
The conversation began with benign pleasantries, with the two 
discussing commonalities in their upbringings, among other 
things.  Mr. Edwards claimed that the conversation eventually 
culminated with Satterfield admitting to Bryant’s murder in 
                                              
3  Both brothers also described the shooter has having 
closely cropped hair, while Satterfield was said to have had a 
bushy Afro of a brown or reddish color.  (J.A. 436, 614.) 
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fairly explicit detail.  Mr. Edwards contacted the police through 
his attorney, and Satterfield was arrested days later.   
 At Satterfield’s trial, Mr. Edwards testified to 
Satterfield’s confession.  The State Respondents characterize 
Mr. Edwards’ testimony on the stand as both credible and 
corroborated by the evidence.  Mr. Edwards told the jury that 
Satterfield had not reported his altercation with Bryant to the 
police because he assumed it would be futile based on a past 
experience with a customer.  Mr. Edwards also explained that 
Satterfield had admitted to disposing of his .44 caliber gun—
the purported murder weapon—shortly after the killing, only 
to later tell police the firearm had been stolen.  According to 
the State Respondents, Mr. Edwards also testified to details of 
the crime that nobody beside the killer could have known; for 
instance, that the killer had fired four shots at the victim and 
that the victim was running away at the time he was struck.4  
Satterfield took the stand in his own defense.  He 
admitted that he had told Mr. Edwards that he was once 
suspected of murder and recounted to Mr. Edwards the details 
laid bare in the search warrants he had been served with during 
the investigation.  But Satterfield insisted that Mr. Edwards had 
fabricated the rest of the confession, possibly prompted by a 
developing romantic relationship between Satterfield and Mr. 
Edwards’ wife.  Satterfield also testified that he had owned a 
.44 caliber special gun like the one used in Bryant’s murder, 
but reaffirmed that it had been stolen in an unreported burglary 
years before the killing.  He nonetheless admitted that he had 
                                              
 4 We note, however, that the search warrants indicated 
four bullets were removed from Bryant’s body.  (J.A. 708.) 
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purchased .44 special ammunition on the very day that he was 
assaulted by Bryant.   
Satterfield was represented by attorney Lee Mandell at 
his murder trial.  Mandell did not call either of the Freeman 
brothers as witnesses, nor did Mandell even interview either of 
the brothers prior to trial.5  Instead, the only mention of either 
brother’s eyewitness statement came when Satterfield read 
Eric Freeman’s description of the suspect from a search 
warrant affidavit.  The jury convicted Satterfield of first degree 
murder in June 1985.   
After his conviction, Satterfield filed post-verdict 
motions alleging that Mandell was ineffective for failing to 
present the Freemans as defense witnesses at trial.  The trial 
court held an evidentiary hearing during which it heard 
testimony from Mandell and both Freeman brothers.  Eric 
Freeman repeated his earlier description of the suspect as a 
white man with blonde hair.  (J.A. 642.)  Grady Freeman, 
however, took the opportunity to clarify his initial description 
of the suspect as having “light skin,” now explaining that the 
suspect was “Caucasian” and had light blonde hair.  (J.A. 620.)  
He further proclaimed that he was “positive” Satterfield was 
not the man he had seen at the time of the shooting.  (J.A. 620.)  
Importantly, there was some sparring at the evidentiary hearing 
over whether Grady’s initial statement to police that the 
                                              
 5 Mandell testified his investigator had encountered 
difficulty tracking the Freeman brothers down.  Both brothers, 
however, responded to the State’s subpoena to appear for the 
trial.  Satterfield’s initial post-trial counsel, Ms. Gelb, also had 
no problem locating the brothers and easily procuring their 
appearance at the post-trial motion hearing.   
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suspect was light-skinned meant that the suspect had lighter 
black skin or was white.  (J.A. 612.)   
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
dismissed Satterfield’s post-verdict motion and sentenced him 
to life imprisonment.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court then 
denied his appeal, determining that that Mandell had pursued a 
valid trial strategy in attempting to avoid a rebuttal of Eric’s 
favorable description of the suspect with Grady’s initial 
statement.  (J.A. 675.)   But the Superior Court’s conclusion 
relied on its observation that Grady Freeman had identified the 
fleeing man “as a ‘light-skinned’ black male, with cut short 
hair, in his early thirties,” a description which “closely fit that 
of Satterfield.”  (J.A. 674.)  Later, the District Court presiding 
over Satterfield’s habeas proceedings would point out that the 
Superior Court’s characterization of Grady’s statement was in 
error.  Grady Freeman had never described the suspect as a 
“light-skinned black male,” but merely as “light-skinned.”  
Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
allocatur. 
Satterfield next filed a pro se King’s Bench petition 
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1996.  This petition 
was denied, along with his petition for reconsideration.  
Satterfield’s 1997 pro se PCRA petition was also denied, and 
his appeals were unsuccessful.   
In 2002—almost 20 years after Bryant’s murder—
Satterfield filed a federal habeas petition raising nine claims, 
including actual innocence and ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for failing to present the Freemans as witnesses.  A 
Magistrate Judge initially recommended the petition be 
dismissed as time-barred.  After finding that Satterfield’s 
King’s Bench petition was a “properly filed” application for 
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state post-conviction review, the District Court remanded the 
petition to the Magistrate Judge for further analysis of the 
timeliness issue and the merits of Satterfield’s claims.  The 
Magistrate Judge then issued a supplemental report 
recommending Satterfield’s claims be denied on their merits, 
which the District Court initially adopted.  But after 
Satterfield’s objections, the District Court granted relief on his 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  The District Court 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
determination that Mandell had a reasonable basis in not 
putting forth the Freemans’ testimony was based, as mentioned 
earlier, on a misreading of Grady Freeman’s statement.  
Satterfield v. Johnson, 322 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620, 623–24 (E.D. 
Pa. 2004).  The District Court, however, adopted the 
supplemental report and recommendation of the Magistrate 
Judge denying relief on Satterfield’s other claims.  Id. at 624. 
The State Respondents appealed the District Court’s 
decision, arguing that Satterfield’s petition should be 
dismissed as time-barred.  We reversed and remanded, finding 
that Satterfield’s King’s Bench petition to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was not a “properly filed” collateral challenge 
to his conviction for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), 
and thus did not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations.  
Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2006).  We 
also determined that Satterfield was not entitled to equitable 
tolling.  Id. at 196.  Upon remand, the District Court dismissed 
Satterfield’s petition. 
In 2014, approximately 30 years after Satterfield’s 
arrest in connection with Bryant’s murder, he filed a motion 
with the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(6) seeking relief from the judgment dismissing his 
habeas petition.  Satterfield argued that the Supreme Court’s 
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holding in McQuiggin was a change in decisional law that 
served as an extraordinary circumstance upon which Rule 
60(b)(6) relief may issue.  McQuiggin held that “actual 
innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a 
petitioner may pass” to overcome an untimely petition under 
AEDPA.  133 S. Ct. at 1928.  Upon review, the District Court 
ruled that McQuiggin was not a ground for relief and denied 
the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.  Satterfield then requested a 
Certificate of Appealability, which we granted on the issue of 
whether McQuiggin, either alone or in combination with other 
equitable factors, is sufficient to invoke relief from final 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) to allow an appellant to raise an 
otherwise time-barred valid claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 
§ 2241 and § 2254.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253.  We review the District Court’s 
denial of Satterfield’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of 
discretion.  Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).  “A 
district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.”  
Id. 
III. 
Satterfield invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(6) to seek relief from the District Court’s judgment 
dismissing his habeas petition.  Rule 60(b) provides litigants 
with a mechanism by which they may obtain relief from a final 
judgment “under a limited set of circumstances including 
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fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.”  Gonzalez v. 
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005).  Satterfield specifically 
relies upon Rule 60(b)(6), a catch-all provision extending 
beyond the listed circumstances to “any other reason that 
justifies relief.”  Despite the open-ended nature of the 
provision, a district court may only grant relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) in “extraordinary circumstances where, without such 
relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.”  
Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 
F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Boughner v. Sec’y of 
Health, Ed. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1978).  This 
is a difficult standard to meet, and “[s]uch circumstances will 
rarely occur in the habeas context.”  Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. 
Satterfield asserts in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion that a 
change in relevant decisional law occurring after his petition 
had been denied is an extraordinary circumstance upon which 
his Rule 60(b)(6) relief may issue.  Satterfield identifies the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in McQuiggin—handed down seven 
years after the District Court dismissed Satterfield’s habeas 
petition on remand—as an intervening change in relevant 
decisional law that requires such relief.  McQuiggin focused on 
the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, a doctrine 
that had previously been applied to allow a habeas petitioner 
“to pursue his constitutional claims . . . on the merits 
notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief” 
where the petitioner makes “a credible showing of actual 
innocence.”  133 S. Ct. at 1931.  The Supreme Court clarified 
that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would 
also permit a petitioner to overcome a petition that failed to 
comply with AEDPA’s statute of limitations.  Even so, a 
petitioner asserting actual innocence may not avail himself of 
the exception “unless he persuades the district court that, in 
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light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. 
at 1928, 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 
(1995)).   
The decision in McQuiggin is particularly relevant to 
Satterfield’s case because we reversed his successful 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim after finding that his 
petition was untimely under AEDPA.  Had McQuiggin been in 
place at the time of Satterfield’s habeas proceedings, an 
appropriate showing of actual innocence may have allowed 
Satterfield to overcome his untimely petition and pursue his 
ineffective assistance claim.  Thus, we must determine whether 
McQuiggin is a change in decisional law that can serve as an 
extraordinary circumstance upon which Rule 60(b)(6) relief 
may issue, either on its own or when paired with the equitable 
circumstances of the case. 
A. 
 Satterfield properly characterizes McQuiggin as 
effecting a change in our decisional law.  Prior to McQuiggin, 
we had never affirmatively held that a showing of actual 
innocence could serve as an equitable exception to AEDPA’s 
one-year statute of limitations.  In fact, several circuits were 
split on the issue of whether such an equitable exception or 
basis for equitable tolling existed at the time McQuiggin was 
decided.  Compare Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 548 (2d Cir. 
2012) (a compelling claim of actual innocence may excuse an 
otherwise untimely habeas petition); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 
929, 934 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same); San Martin v. 
McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); 
Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(same); and Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2005) 
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(same), with David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(a showing of actual innocence does not excuse an otherwise 
untimely filing of a habeas petition); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 
F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); and Escamilla v. 
Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2004) (same). 
We had numerous opportunities to confront habeas 
petitioners’ arguments that their actual innocence should 
permit an equitable exception to, or equitable tolling of,6 the 
statute of limitations.  In each case, we declined to decide 
whether a showing of actual innocence could provide a basis 
for an equitable exception or equitable tolling in the habeas 
context and instead opted to sidestep the issue by determining 
that the petitioners had failed to establish actual innocence.  
See, e.g., Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 329 n.16 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (noting that other circuits were split on the existence 
of an actual innocence exception, but declining to consider the 
issue because the petitioner had shown the diligence and 
extraordinary circumstances sufficient for equitable tolling); 
Scott v. Lavan, 190 F. App’x 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2006) (declining 
to consider whether an actual innocence exception exists 
because the petitioner had no basis to assert a claim of actual 
innocence); Hussmann v. Vaughn, 67 F. App’x 667, 669 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (same); see also Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 
191 (3d Cir. 2012) (avoiding the question of whether actual 
                                              
6 The Supreme Court explained in McQuiggin that there 
is a distinction between equitable tolling, where a petitioner 
seeks an extension of the prescribed statutory period to file, and 
an equitable exception, which would permit a petitioner to 
override the statute of limitations.  133 S. Ct. at 1931; see also 
Rivas, 687 F.3d at 547 n.42 (distinguishing between equitable 
tolling and equitable exceptions). 
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innocence allowed for equitable tolling, and instead finding the 
petitioner’s showing of actual innocence to be inadequate); 
Teagle v. Diguglielmo, 336 F. App’x 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(same); Knecht v. Shannon, 132 F. App’x 407, 409 (3d Cir. 
2005) (same).  While Satterfield could have looked to other 
circuits to make an equitable-exception argument at the time 
his petition was denied, actual innocence had not yet been 
established as a basis for an equitable exception to untimely 
filing under AEDPA in our circuit.7   
B. 
 We turn next to whether the change in law borne by 
McQuiggin may properly serve as the basis of a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion.  Precedent makes clear that changes in decisional law 
alone will “rarely” constitute “extraordinary circumstances” 
for purposes of a Rule 60(b) motion.  Cox, 757 F.3d at 121.  
Satterfield’s reliance on an intervening change in the law is 
hardly novel in the habeas context, and petitioners have had 
little success with such arguments.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby is a prime example of the 
difficulty of pursuing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a 
change in law.  In Gonzalez, a district court had denied a 
prisoner’s habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds.  
The prisoner later sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief, arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 
U.S. 4 (2000), marked a change in the interpretation of 
                                              
7 Satterfield did argue that actual innocence should 
allow for equitable tolling at the time of his petition.   
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AEDPA’s statute of limitations.8  Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536.  
The Court affirmed the denial of the prisoner’s Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion, emphasizing that the district court’s initial ruling on 
the timeliness of the petition was consistent with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s then-prevailing interpretation of the statute.  In that 
sense, the Court observed, “[i]t is hardly extraordinary that 
subsequently, after petitioner’s case was no longer pending, 
this Court arrived at a different interpretation,” and “[a]lthough 
[the Court’s] constructions of federal statutes customarily 
apply to all cases then pending on direct review, not every 
interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the 
requirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases 
long since final.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
 Both the State Respondents and the District Court 
interpret Gonzalez as foreclosing Rule 60(b)(6) relief in 
Satterfield’s case.  They conclude that the change in law 
brought about by McQuiggin—or any change in habeas law for 
that matter—cannot serve as an extraordinary circumstance 
justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  But Gonzalez does not mean 
that a change in law may never serve as the basis for Rule 
60(b)(6) relief.  See Cox, 757 F.3d at 123 (“Gonzalez did not 
say that a new interpretation of the federal habeas statutes—
much less, the equitable principles invoked to aid their 
enforcement—is always insufficient to sustain a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion.”).  Rather, Gonzalez leaves open the possibility that a 
                                              
8 The Supreme Court in Artuz held “that an application 
for state postconviction relief can be ‘properly filed’ even if the 
state courts dismiss it as procedurally barred.”  Gonzalez, 545 
U.S. at 527.   
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change in law may—when accompanied by appropriate 
equitable circumstances—support Rule 60(b)(6) relief.9   
                                              
9 The State’s brief and District Court’s opinion cite 
several Eastern District of Pennsylvania decisions holding that 
the change in law in McQuiggin is not an “extraordinary 
circumstance” that can support a 60(b)(6) motion.  See, e.g., 
Garcia v. Varner, Civ. A. No. 00-3668, 2014 WL 2777398, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2014); Williams v. Patrick, Civ. A. No. 
07-776, 2014 WL 2452049, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2014); 
Pridgen v. Shannon, Civ. A. No. 00-4561, 2014 WL 1884919, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2014); Akiens v. Wynder, Civ. A. No. 
06-5239, 2014 WL 1202746, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2014).  
All of these decisions compare McQuiggin to Gonzalez, noting 
that both represent a change in decisional law based on the 
interpretation of the federal habeas statute of limitations.  As 
in Gonzalez, these courts found that McQuiggin was not 
sufficient to be an extraordinary circumstance.  We later 
explain that McQuiggin is not merely a change in the 
procedural law governing the statute of limitations in habeas 
cases, as Gonzalez was.  But to the extent that McQuiggin and 
Gonzalez are similar, our decision in Cox, emphatically rejects 
the notion that a particular change in law is never an 
extraordinary circumstance.  Notably, all of these district court 
cases were decided before Cox was issued, and none engage in 
a thorough examination of the case-specific equities. 
The State Respondents also cite several cases from 
other circuits, all of which were rendered before Cox.  See, e.g., 
Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 2014); Ryburn 
v. Ramos, No. 09-cv-1176, 2014 WL 51880, at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. 
Jan. 7, 2014); Rodgers v. Pfister, No. 11-3120, 2013 WL 
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Our decision in Cox, rendered almost ten years after 
Gonzalez, further confirms that our Circuit has “not embraced 
any categorical rule that a change in decisional law is never an 
adequate basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”  Id. at 121–22.  
Instead, we have consistently taken the position “that 
intervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from final 
judgments under 60(b)(6).”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Rather 
than impose any per se or bright-line rule that a particular 
change in law is never an extraordinary circumstance, we 
adhere to a “case-dependent analysis” rooted in equity.  Id. at 
124.  This analysis manifests as a “flexible, multifactor 
approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions . . . that takes into account 
all the particulars of a movant’s case,” even where the 
proffered ground for relief is a post-judgment change in the 
law.10  Cox, 757 F.3d at 122.  
                                              
5745835, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2013).  Indeed, the Fifth 
Circuit decision in Tamayo relies on an earlier decision in 
Adams v. Thayler, 679 F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 2012), which we 
explicitly declined to adopt in Cox.  757 F.3d at 121.   
10 We have explained that district courts should 
examine, “inter alia, [1] the general desirability that a final 
judgment should not be lightly disturbed; [2] the procedure 
provided by Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal; [3] 
the Rule should be liberally construed for the purpose of 
doing substantial justice; [4] whether, although the motion is 
made within the maximum time, if any, provided by the Rule, 
the motion is made within a reasonable time; ... [5] whether 
there are any intervening equities which make it inequitable 
to grant relief; [6] any other factor that is relevant to the 
justice of the [order] under attack....”  Lasky v. Cont’l Prods. 
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In this context, we opt for more analysis of the equitable 
circumstances at play in Satterfield’s case.  The District Court 
concluded that the change of law in McQuiggin was not an 
extraordinary circumstance that could support Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief.  As best we can tell, it incorrectly focused on whether 
McQuiggin, in isolation, was sufficient to serve as an 
extraordinary circumstance.  Cox, on the other hand, requires a 
district court to consider the full panoply of equitable 
circumstances before reaching its decision.  Whenever a 
petitioner bases a Rule 60(b)(6) motion on a change in 
decisional law, the court should evaluate the nature of the 
change along with all of the equitable circumstances and 
clearly articulate the reasoning underlying its ultimate 
determination.  Thus we remand.   
We will vacate the order of the District Court as it 
relates to Satterfield’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and remand to it 
to carry out another analysis.  The task of weighing the 
equitable factors in order to grant or deny a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion is “left, in the first instance, to the discretion of a district 
court.”  Cox, 757 F.3d at 124.  Should the District Court grant 
Satterfield’s motion, he will be permitted to pursue his 
meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim once 
more.   
IV. 
While the District Court must take the first pass at 
weighing the equitable factors involved in Satterfield’s Rule 
60(b)(6) motion, we emphasize that the nature of the change in 
                                              
Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Mayberry v. 
Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
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decisional law itself must be a factor in the analysis.  The 
principles underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McQuiggin are fundamental to our system of government and 
are important to the inquiry on remand.  
McQuiggin allows a petitioner who makes a credible 
showing of actual innocence to pursue his or her constitutional 
claims even in spite of AEDPA’s statute of limitations by 
utilizing the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception—
an exception “grounded in the ‘equitable discretion’ of habeas 
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in 
the incarceration of innocent persons.”  McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1931.  Underlying the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice 
exception is a “[s]ensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an 
innocent individual,” and the doctrine aims “to balance the 
societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce 
judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that 
arises in the extraordinary case.”  Id. at 1932.  For this reason, 
“‘[i]n appropriate cases,’ the principles of comity and finality 
that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must yield to 
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust 
incarceration.’”  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986) 
(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 109, 135 (1982)) (alteration 
in the original).  The Supreme Court has underscored the 
importance of these principles, explaining that “concern about 
the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent 
person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system.  
That concern is reflected, for example, in the ‘fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict 
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.’”  Id. at 325 
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
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The values encompassed by the fundamental-
miscarriage-of-justice exception and which drive the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McQuiggin cannot be divorced from the 
Rule 60(b)(6) inquiry.  Cox requires a weighing of the 
equitable factors at play in a particular case, and the nature of 
the change in law itself is highly relevant to that analysis.  
McQuiggin illustrates that where a petitioner makes an 
adequate showing of actual innocence, our interest in avoiding 
the wrongful conviction of an innocent person permits the 
petitioner to pursue his constitutional claims in spite of the 
statute-of-limitations bar.  This interest is so deeply embedded 
within our system of justice that we fail to see a set of 
circumstances under which this change in law, paired with a 
petitioner’s adequate showing of actual innocence, would not 
be sufficient to support Rule 60(b)(6) relief in this context.11  
Put another way, a proper demonstration of actual innocence 
by Satterfield should permit Rule 60(b)(6) relief unless the 
totality of equitable circumstances ultimately weigh heavily in 
the other direction.  A contrary conclusion would leave open 
the possibility of preventing a petitioner who can make a 
credible showing of actual innocence from utilizing the 
fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception simply because 
we had not yet accepted its applicability at the time his petition 
was decided—an outcome that would plainly betray the 
principles upon which the exception was built.  Such an 
outcome would also implicate two factors of the Rule 60(b) 
                                              
11 This also marks the key difference between 
McQuiggin and Gonzalez, where the change in law was a 
statutory interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of limitations, not 
an equitable exception to the statute’s procedural requirements.   
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analysis recently identified by the Supreme Court: “the risk of 
injustice to the parties” and “the risk of undermining the 
public’s confidence in the judicial process.”  Buck v. Davis, 
137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).  Thus, if a petitioner can make a 
showing of actual innocence, McQuiggin’s change in law is 
almost certainly an exceptional circumstance.12  
Given this observation about the importance of the 
change in law effected by McQuiggin and the weight it should 
carry in the equitable analysis, a court should focus its efforts 
primarily on determining whether Satterfield has made an 
adequate showing of actual innocence to justify relief.  The 
change in law brought about by McQuiggin will only permit 
him to overcome his time-barred petition if he can make a 
credible showing of actual innocence—a burdensome task that 
requires a petitioner to “persuade[] the district court that, in 
light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928, 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 
at 329).  Thus, the miscarriage-of-justice exception and 
McQuiggin’s holding more broadly will not be applicable to 
Satterfield’s case if he cannot make a proper showing of actual 
innocence, and the District Court must determine whether such 
a showing has been made as a threshold matter.  We leave this 
inquiry entirely to the District Court on remand, and recognize 
that the issue may require an evidentiary hearing during which 
other equitable factors may come into play.  
                                              
 12 Because the equitable circumstances must be 
balanced, we acknowledge that, just as there may be facts that 
strengthen the determination that a change in law is 
extraordinary, there could also be a set of heavily unfavorable 
facts that require a different outcome. 
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Among these additional equitable factors, the District 
Court may consider Satterfield’s meritorious ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim.  The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Buck v. Davis established that the severity of the 
underlying constitutional violation is an equitable factor that 
may support a finding of extraordinary circumstances under 
Rule 60(b)(6).  The appellant in Buck sought to vacate the 
court’s judgment so he could present an otherwise defaulted 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  137 S. Ct. at 
777–79. 
McQuiggin also makes relevant whether Satterfield 
raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, as the actual innocence exception only provides a 
gateway for courts to review a petitioner’s separate claim of 
constitutional error.  See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931; see 
also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316–17 (noting that petitioners 
seeking habeas relief carry less of a burden when their 
convictions are the result of unfair proceedings—and the actual 
innocence threshold standard applies—than when they have 
been convicted after a fair trial).  Because Satterfield’s claim 
of constitutional error—counsel’s unreasonable failure to 
investigate and present exculpatory eyewitness testimony—is 
the reason why the actual innocence exception could apply to 
his case, the gravity of that error bears on the weight of his 
McQuiggin claim.   
In previously granting Satterfield’s ineffective-
assistance claim, the District Court concluded that Satterfield’s 
counsel was ineffective in failing to call the Freeman brothers 
as witnesses or otherwise to present their testimony, and that 
counsel’s error prejudiced Satterfield.  Such a finding of 
constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is rare.  Thus, the District 
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Court may consider weighing this factor in favor of finding 
extraordinary circumstances.   
Because the District Court is ruling on a Rule 60(b) 
motion in the habeas context, it may also account for the 
“[p]rinciples of finality and comity, as expressed through 
AEDPA and habeas jurisprudence” by “consider[ing] whether 
the conviction and initial federal habeas proceeding were only 
recently completed or ended years ago.”  Cox, 757 F.3d at 125.  
When more time has elapsed since the final conviction, a court 
will give more weight to the state’s interest in finality.   
The Supreme Court, however, has established that 
considerations of finality and comity must yield to the 
fundamental right not to be wrongfully convicted.  See House 
v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 320–
21 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); cf. Calderon v. Thompson, 
523 U.S. 538, 557 (1998) (“In the absence of a strong showing 
of ‘actual innocence,’ the State’s interests in actual finality 
outweigh the prisoner’s interest in obtaining yet another 
opportunity for review.” (citation omitted)).  Hence the District 
Court should give less weight to these factors when a petitioner 
asserts a threshold claim of actual innocence.  The fact that 
Satterfield’s state proceeding ended a decade ago should not 
preclude him from obtaining relief under Rule 60(b) if the court 
concludes that he has raised a colorable claim that he meets this 
threshold actual-innocence standard and that other equitable 
factors weigh in his favor.   
As we have explained, though, the weighing of the 
equitable factors in this case belongs to the District Court in 
the first instance.  Though we have pointed out the importance 
of the change in McQuiggin and its weight in the Rule 60(b)(6) 
analysis—as well as several other equitable factors for 
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consideration—we express no opinion on the final outcome.  
The District Court is best positioned to carry out this analysis.     
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the April 16, 
2015 order of the District Court with respect to the denial of 
Satterfield’s request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief and remand for 
reconsideration of the whether the change of law wrought by 
McQuiggin, combined with the other circumstances of the 
case, merits relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  
